* 5/10/2012
Ana Stanič - Building a New State 2012
Ana Stanič - Building a New State 2012
LESSONS FROM THE SLOVENIAN CASE OF INDEPENDENCE
Presentació de la jurista eslovena Ana Stanic a Building a New State 2012.
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Quan escolto a en Mas i en Junqueras dir que ens hauríem de quedar entre el 20% i el 25% del deute d'Espanya (entre 200.000 i 250.000 milions) si Espanya s'avingués a reconèixer una Catalunya independent, no puc deixar de pensar que són uns autèntics irresponsables i m'esfereix pensar que aquest parell puguin tenir res a veure en una negociació amb Espanya un cop independitzats. Ja ho va dir fa anys una experta internacional en secessions, Ana Stanič, en unes Jornades* a l'Ateneu de Barcelona l'any 2012: "Feu els deures abans de seure a negociar si no hi podeu perdre molt". I aquest parell ja van encolomant sense cap necessitat més de 200.000 milions a les generacions presents i futures. Estarien més macos amb la boqueta ben tancada.
He trobat la següent reflexió per internet, amb la qual coincideixo totalment: "El repartiment del deute és una qüestió per als experts en Dret Internacional, no per als economistes. I els experts en Dret Internacional diuen clarament que NOMÉS ens correspon assumir el 16 % del deute contret per Espanya per fer inversions a Catalunya, més el 16 % del deute no territorialitzable (per ex., despeses militars, ambaixades,etc.), sempre i quan rebem també el 16 % dels actius corresponents. De cap de les maneres ens correspon assumir el deute per les seves inversions deficitàries a la resta d'Espanya. I a més podem exigir el principi de contribució històrica (per ex., al Fons de Seguretat Social), el principi d'enriquiment sense causa (que, donat l'espoli fiscal de 300.000 milions d'euros dels últims 25 anys, ens converteix en el principal creditor mundial d'Espanya), el caràcter de deute ominós del deute de la Generalitat (perquè va ser causat per l'asfíxia econòmica d'Espanya, cosa que ens permeteix restar-lo del deute a assumir) i fins i tot es pot exigir indemnització pel lucre cessant i per la històrica repressió lingüística. CONCLUSIÓ: Espanya ens deu tant que NO tenim cap obligació d'assumir ni un euro del seu deute. Per tant, només hauríem de satisfer el deute de la Generalitat, que és només del 30 % del PIB, el MÉS BAIX d'Europa."
Això és el que plantejaria un bon negociador i no la bajanada que proposen en Mas i en Junqueras.
Josep Castany, Director General de Catalunya Acció
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LESSONS FROM THE SLOVENIAN CASE OF INDEPENDENCE
Ana Stanič Barcelona, 5 October 2012 1 www.ealaw.eu
1. Background
• Ethnic tension is WRONGLY considered as the cause of the break-up of Yugoslavia
• Causes were FOREMOSTLY economic and constitutional
• Under the 1974 Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a highly de-centralised federal state ¾ Six constitutive Republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia ¾ Two autonomous regions: Kosovo and Vojvodina (part of Serbia)
• In 1980s Yugoslavia was in a severe economic crisis, inflation was rampant
• Slovenia was a net contributor to SFRY budget www.ealaw.eu
2. 1974 Constitution
• Preamble The peoples of Yugoslavia, on the basis of the right of every people to self-determination, including the right to secession …. have united in a federal republic of free and equal peoples
• Article 1 SFRY is a federal state of voluntarily united peoples and their socialist republics and the socialist autonomous regions ...
• Article 277: A dispute between federal and Republic/AP regarding implementation of federal laws shall be referred to Federal Parliament which will decide on the matter
• Houses of Parliament and Constitutional Court decided by majority
• Article 378: Constitutional Court could only issue an opinion to Federal Parliament if constitutions of Republics/AP are not in line with 1974 Constitution 2 www.ealaw.eu
3. Constitutional Crisis (1)
• 1988 amendments to Constitution curtailed the autonomy of the Republics and AP (Slovenia should have called a referendum)
• Strikes in Kosovo in February 1989, State of Emergency Declared; Meeting of support of Kosovars in Slovenia as Serb actions in Kosovo seen as an attack on 1974 Constitution
• 27 March 1989 Serbia “adopted” a new constituion of Serbia which abolished Kosovo’s autonomy
• 26 July 1989 amendments to Slovenian Constitution including Amendment X on right to self-determination including secession
• 26 September 1989 Constitutional Court held that it cannot rule on the incompatibility of proposed Slovenian amendments 3 www.ealaw.eu
3. Constitutional Crisis (2)
• Attempts to table before Yugoslav Constitutional Court a motion that multiparty elections are unconstitutional failed
• 16 January 1990 Constitutional Court held that Amendment X was not unconstitutional
• Spring 1990 saw first multi-party elections throughout Yugoslavia
• 2 July 1990 Slovenian Parliament Adopted Declaration of Sovereignty
• 5 July Serbian Parliament adopted law abolishing Kosovo Houses of Parliament
• Constitutional Court held hearing on 12 July to determine whether the Slovenian Declaration is anti-constitutional but no review of actions adopted by Serbian Parliament 4 www.ealaw.eu
4. Referendum for Independence
• Calls for independence from Yugoslavia were not mainstream in either Slovenia or Croatia in 1988 and 1989
• In fact, the political elite in Slovenia did not embrace these calls until mid-1990, after Yugoslavia had ceased to be a functioning state
• Campaign for Referendum started end of November
• 6 December 1990 Slovenian Parliament passed Law on Referendum for Independance
• An attempt to get Constitutional Court to issue provisional measures to prevent the refernfum from being held failed on 20 December 1990
• On 23 December 1990 95% voted in favour of independence
www.ealaw.eu Estimate of Costs of Marketing Campaign in Support of Referendum www.ealaw.eu
5. Lessons from Slovenia
1. Key lesson: Steps must be taken to ensure that dialogue continues between Spain and Catalunya and with the other regions
2. Spanish central government must resist the temptation to use the economic crisis to centralise Spain A functioning democracy presumes a continuous dialogue in order to ensure that democratic institutions continue to evolve and reflect the aspirations and will of all people
3. EU must actively be engaged in this dialogue which goes to the heart of democratic rule and human rights
4. There is a need for STRUCTURED negotiations
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