Barcelona (Catalonia)
 
            
Is Spain next to go on the Brussels dole? Not if the assurances coming out of Spanish officials lately are to be believed.
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, addressing reporters in Poland this 
month: "Spain will not be rescued. The alarm is unjustified. . . . It's 
not possible to rescue Spain. There's no intention of it, and we don't 
need it."
Mr. Rajoy, at a conference of his People's Party in Madrid: 
"[Investors] lend to you if they are confident you will pay it back. . .
 . There are countries near to us that couldn't, and they are in the 
situation everyone knows about. This is not the case for Spain."
Economy Minister Luis de Guindos, on the possibility of a Spanish 
bank rescue: "The government won't create anything, neither a good bank 
nor a bad bank, and there won't even be the smallest bit of public money
 available."
The good news is that markets don't seem to be buying Madrid's sanguinity. That's also, of course, the bad news. 
***
Spain's crisis isn't of a 
piece with Greece's or Portugal's, and it won't be resolved in the same 
way. The Spanish economy is much larger, but its ailments are not 
principally fiscal. Public debt was 65.8% of GDP at the end of last 
year. Indebtedness actually fell between 1996 and 2007 before climbing 
again during the financial crisis.
Rather than fixating on deficit 
targets, official Europe should be watching the danger lurking in 
Spanish banks. Like the Irish, Spaniards overinvested in property during
 the easy-money days, and banks' losses on residential mortgage-backed 
securities will probably trigger some form of public support as the 
housing bubble deflates further. Irish property values halved between 
peak and trough, whereas Spanish real-estate prices have so far only 
fallen about a quarter from their 2007 highs.
Still, the billion-euro issues are 
growth and structural reform. On these, too, Mr. Rajoy has assured and 
reassured markets and policy makers of his resolve. But here in 
Catalonia, the autonomous region of Spain whose capital is Barcelona, 
few are counting on Madrid to do the right thing.
For now, the evidence is on the 
doubters' side. In February, the prime minister passed a major law that 
addressed, among the Spanish labor market's many malignancies, Spain's 
menu of around 40 types of employment contracts. As Mr. de Guindos wrote
 in a Journal op-ed in January, Madrid's goal is a system with two 
contracts: one for full-time workers and another for temporary labor.
Yet February's reform did not reduce 
the number of contracts. Instead, it created a new one, for firms with 
fewer than 50 employees.
Catalans have additional reasons to 
question the Spanish government's capacity for change. Of late Mr. Rajoy
 has been blaming Spain's regional governments for the country's deficit
 overruns, saying that wayward local spending had jeopardized the entire
 nation's creditworthiness. Madrid has threatened to intervene in the 
regional governments' budgets if they don't tidy their books on their 
own.
                
                
Carlos III put Spain on the road to overinvestment.
 
 
 
But 
according to Andreu Mas-Colell, Catalonia's economy minister, the real 
story is a little different. He explains that with the exception of the 
Basque Country, Spain's 17 regions enjoy spending autonomy but almost no
 revenue autonomy. It's up to the central government to decide how 
nationwide revenue gets distributed between regions, and there's no 
guarantee that what a region's citizens pay to Madrid is returned 
euro-for-euro in funding to that region.
That means the central government can 
make its own budget shortfalls look smaller—and the regional 
governments' look bigger—simply by keeping more of the revenue pot to 
itself.
The result? Catalonia is the seat of 
Spanish industry and one of the most important industrial districts in 
Europe, lagging only the likes of Italy's Lombardy and the German Ruhr 
in productivity. Yet each year since 1986, an average of 9% of 
Catalonia's GDP in net terms has left the region to be redistributed or 
spent by Madrid. In Spain, only the Balearic Islands surrender a larger 
share of their annual output. Nowhere else in Europe or North America do
 intra-national transfers of such size occur as a matter of course.
"In discretionary expenses we feel we 
have been historically shortchanged," Mr. Mas-Colell says. "We represent
 15% of the population, and we represent close to 18% in terms of GNP. .
 . . In this year's budget, the investment in Catalonia is 11% of public
 investment in Spain."
"There are inefficiencies in the 
autonomous communities for sure," he adds. "But not to a larger extent 
than the inefficiencies in the central administration. . . . Spain in 
all its components has to gain on efficiency, on liberalization, on 
flexibility."
Seen this way, Madrid's threats to 
recentralize fiscal policy look like a political play that distracts 
from reforms that could actually help the regional governments close 
their budget gaps. Mr. Mas-Colell says that it's up to Madrid, for 
instance, to make regulatory changes that would enable hospitals to 
charge for prescriptions, meals and overnight stays, as his government 
is trying to do.
He also notes that Barcelona has cut government employees' wages. Madrid hasn't.
It's a little bewildering that Madrid 
would choose to inflame separatist feeling in Catalonia at a time of 
national crisis. More than 40% of Catalans now say they'd support 
seceding from Spain. But Madrid's centuries-long jiu-jitsu with the 
regions suggests something about the national character, according to 
Germà Bel, an economist at the University of Barcelona. Centralized 
control, Mr. Bel told me, is in "the genetics of the Spanish state."
The example Mr. Bel and others like to
 use is infrastructure investment, which Spain's leaders since the 17th 
century have deployed to affirm their rule and proclaim the Spanish 
nation. Today Spain, the fifth largest EU member state by GDP and by 
population, has more international airports and more miles of motorways 
than any other country in Continental Europe. It has more miles of 
high-speed rail than any country in the world except China; it also has 
the lowest ridership per mile of high-speed rail in the world. More 
miles of high-speed rail are currently under construction in Spain than 
in all other EU countries combined. 
***
Fast trains to nowhere are
 emblems of government folly the world over. But Spain's centralizing 
impulse runs deeper than most, Mr. Bel says. Ever since the 18th-century
 Bourbon kings, Spain's leaders have sought to make their state in 
France's image: strongly unified, with power amassed at the center and 
all roads (or rails) extending outward from the capital.
But the Iberian kingdoms' strong 
cultural and historical identities meant that yoking them together has 
created continuous unease. Spain's rulers made "a bad copy" of France, 
said Ferran Requejo, a political scientist at Pompeu Fabra University, 
when we met last week.
Even a facsimile shares some 
characteristics with the real thing. In Spain, Mr. Bel says, "Any type 
of economic reforms that increase flexibility and uncertainty will be 
heavily resisted."
"This was the case, for instance, in 
the case of [February's] labor reform. They didn't significantly change 
the way in which collective bargaining is conducted. Firms can decrease 
wages, but still the collective bargaining is at the provincial level . .
 . This is going to be bad two or three years from now."
Is it unfair to take Madrid's attitude
 toward the regions as a weathervane for its ability to undertake 
structural reforms generally? Throughout Europe, politicians are 
discovering the limits to governing from the center during a crisis. 
There are rigidities associated with concentrated authority, but there 
are also important questions of legitimacy and shared cause.
"The fact is," Mr. Bel says of 
Catalonia and Spain, "there is a sense of being different nations." 
Under strain, the EU is learning that it, too, is made up of different 
nations. Brussels could use its own Catalonian thorn in its side: a 
reminder that nations are not just vehicles for paying off their 
governments' debts.
—Mr. Zhong is an editorial page writer for The Wall Street Journal Europe.